RODRIGO RIVERA v. SPS. SALVADOR CHUA AND S. VIOLETA CHUA
GR No. 184458, Jan 14, 2015, First Division Decision, Justice Perez
There are four instances when demand is not necessary to constitute the debtor in default: (1) when there is an express stipulation to that effect; (2) where the law so provides; (3) when the period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and (4) where demand would be useless.
The date of default under the Promissory Note is 1 January 1996, the day following 31 December 1995, the due date of the obligation. On that date, Rivera became liable for the stipulated interest which the Promissory Note says is equivalent to 5% a month.
FACTS:
The parties were friends of long standing having known each other since 1973. In February 1995, Rivera obtained a loan from the Spouses Chua, in the tune of P120,000.00 embodied in a promissory note with stipulations that failure on the part of Rivera to pay the amount on December 31, 1995, he agrees to pay 5% interest monthly from the date of default (January 1, 1996). Three years have passed from the maturity date, when Rivera issued two (2) checks in favor of Chua as payment for the loan, which, upon presentment, were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” In their collection suit, Spouses Chua alleged that they have repeatedly demanded payment from Rivera to no avail. In his Answer, Rivera claimed forgery of the subject Promissory Note and denied his indebtedness thereunder. From the MeTC to the CA, the monetary claim of Spouses Chua was sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a demand from Sps. Chua is needed to make Rivera liable.
RULING:
No, a demand from Sps. Chua is not needed to make Rivera liable.
Demand is no longer necessary because the law is explicit that when the debtor fails to pay upon maturity date, when the obligation is due and demandable, he therefore incurs delay. Art. 1169 of the NCC states, “Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist: 1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare xxx.”
There are four instances when demand is not necessary to constitute the debtor in default: (1) when there is an express stipulation to that effect; (2) where the law so provides; (3) when the period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and (4) where demand would be useless.
In the first two paragraphs, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly that after the period lapses, default will commence. The clause in the Promissory Note containing the stipulation of interest which expressly requires Rivera to pay 5% monthly interest from the date of default until the entire obligation is fully paid. It is evident that the maturity of the obligation on a date certain, December 31, 1995, will give rise to the obligation to pay interest. The date of default under the Promissory Note is 1 January 1996, the day following 31 December 1995, the due date of the obligation. On that date, Rivera became liable for the stipulated interest which the Promissory Note says is equivalent to 5% a month.
In sum, until 31 December 1995, demand was not necessary before Rivera could be held liable for the principal amount of P120,000.00. Thereafter, on 1 January 1996, upon default, Rivera became liable to pay the Spouses Chua damages, in the form of stipulated interest.
LAW I.Q. 